job market paper
abstract
In low-income countries, firms face persistent challenges in hiring, such as costly skill verification and volatile demand. I document an informal solution in which firms in manufacturing clusters lend verified skilled workers to one another, a system I call “labor sharing.” I field novel surveys of over 500 firms and 1,000 workers in Ugandan manufacturing and find nearly 80% of surveyed firms participate. Labor sharing provides state-contingent labor, allowing firms to flexibly meet demand shocks. Stated choice experiments show that firms value labor sharing at a 25% premium over other hiring channels, while workers value it similarly to other referrals. I combine survey and choice experiment data to estimate a hiring model with demand uncertainty and hidden worker skill, and find that labor sharing increases total welfare by 7% relative to an economy without sharing. Gains accrue to both firms and workers, and the economy supports more, smaller firms. Sharing improves allocation within firms over time by smoothing demand shocks, but shifts permanent jobs to lower-productivity lending firms. In counterfactual policy experiments, I show that labor sharing determines which firms gain from skill policies. Certification further concentrates skilled permanent jobs among these lending firms, while training enables higher-productivity borrowing firms to expand their permanent workforce.
working papers
abstract
Many households in developing countries are still unelectrified despite living near grid infrastructure. We propose a new explanation for this persistent challenge: a rigid, regulated price schedule that charges all households the same connection fee and marginal price. We document an informal market in urban Benin that offers the schedule the utility does not. Nearly half of electrified households buy electricity from neighbors who resell it, at a lower connection fee but a higher marginal price. To evaluate our explanation, we study this market by combining an RCT with an equilibrium model. We run an RCT with over 4,000 households, randomizing subsidies for connection fees and marginal prices to estimate demand and supply elasticities. Lower connection fees electrify households with lower electricity demand, and formal consumption subsidies expand informal supply. We use the experimental variation in connection fees and marginal prices to estimate an equilibrium model of electricity demand and supply. The model allows us to quantify the extent to which a menu of price schedules can expand electricity access. The informal market raises electrification rates by 29 percent while a utility menu with a low-fee option would raise electrification rates by 50 percent. These findings illustrate how a rigid price schedule can limit electricity access.
abstract
Rationing policies are often designed with equity considerations in mind, yet whether equalizing exposure delivers equal economic impacts remains underexplored. We study electricity outages in South Africa, where rationing equalizes exposure across locations. Combining high frequency outage data with geocoded transactions from over 11,000 firms from 2021 to 2023, we show that equal exposure does not imply equal impact. Average sales remain unchanged, but outages induce reallocation: below-median firms lose roughly 11 percent of average revenue, while above-median firms gain 10 percent. We provide novel evidence that consumer substitution drives these effects and that advance notice amplifies disparities.
abstract
We investigate the impact of incentives and their removal on parents' decisions to vaccinate subsequent children. We follow up with parents three years after exposure to a bracelet incentive for timely vaccination in Sierra Leone, leveraging the random assignment of clinics to implement the incentive. Since only parents with a newborn at the time of the experiment were eligible for the incentive, we exploit within-clinic variation in exposure. First, we find that parents who received an incentive for an earlier child are 5 to 11% less likely to vaccinate their subsequent child on time compared to parents in the control group. There are no effects on vaccination rates by 15 months of age, suggesting that parents delay vaccination rather than abstaining altogether. Second, parents living in communities where incentives were implemented but who were ineligible for them exhibit no changes in vaccination behavior, ruling out changes in community norms or clinic as explanations. Third, incentives that were valued as signals of vaccination completion do not result in adverse effects after their removal. Our causal forest analysis suggests that parents with higher vaccination costs are most affected by these negative effects. Taken together, our findings suggest that experience of incentives can reduce parents' intrinsic motivation. These findings have important implications: while policy makers commonly focus on moving individuals to adopt a desirable behavior, we show that incentives may significantly impact the motivation of those already performing the desired action.
works in progress
Job Seekers' Beliefs and Labor Market Demand with Erin M. Kelley, Gregory Lane, Harry Moroz, Mohit Negi, and Evelyn Vezza (Registered Report Conditionally Accepted, Journal of Development Economics)
abstract
Job seekers often face challenges in finding jobs that align with their skills and meet employer demands. To address this, we conduct a randomized controlled trial to evaluate whether artificial intelligence can assist job seekers in two key ways: 1) gaining a clearer understanding of their own skills, and 2) identifying careers that align with their skills and labor market demand. This improved understanding should enable job seekers to make more informed decisions about training programs and career paths, resulting in better labor market outcomes — such as securing jobs more quickly, staying employed longer, and achieving greater job satisfaction.
Survey Languages and Belief Elicitation
abstract
Using variation in translation availability across 9 AfroBarometer waves and enumerator assignment, preliminary results show that survey responses regarding institutions, identity, and interpersonal trust vary when respondents are interviewed in their native language, by a native speaker of their language, or in a colonial language.
awarded grants
Becker Friedman Institute Development Economics Research Fund (2025)
Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago Research Grant (2025)
Center for International Social Science Research Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph Field Research Award - $5,000 (2025)
J-PAL King Climate Action Initiative (K-CAI) Implementation Grant (2025)
Weiss Fund for Development Economics Implementation Grant - $25,000 (2025)
J-PAL King Climate Action Initiative (K-CAI) Pilot Grant - $22,760 (2024)
CEPR-STEG PhD Research Grant Data Collection Grant - $19,000 (2024)
IGC Small Research Grant Pilot Grant for Uganda Firm Research - $33,000 (2024)
Weiss Fund for Development Economics Pilot Grant for Electricity Projects - $15,000 (2023)
Weiss Fund for Development Economics Pilot Grant for Uganda Firm Research - $14,445 (2023)
J-PAL King Climate Action Initiative (K-CAI) Proposal Development Grant - $9,090 (2023)
UChicago Development Economics Research Fund Exploratory Travel Grant - $5,000 (2023)