ZACHARY KULOSZEWSKI

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Education

University of Chicago, Ph.D. Economics *2021–present*

Michigan State University, B.S. Economics *2015–2019*

Michigan State University, B.S. Statistics *2015–2019*

References

Professor Marianne Bertrand
University of Chicago
Booth School of Business
marianne.bertrand@chicagobooth.edu
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Professor Erin M. Kelley
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Professor Christina Brown
University of Chicago
Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics
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Research and Teaching Fields

Primary:	Development Economics, Labor Economics
Secondary:	Energy and Environmental Economics, Behavioral Economics

Job Market Paper

The Labor Market Between Firms: Labor Sharing in Urban Uganda

Abstract: *In low-income countries, urban employment is driven by small firms that face challenges in hiring, such as costly skill verification and volatile demand. In Uganda, I document an informal solution to these problems where firms in manufacturing clusters subcontract from one another in a system that I call "labor sharing". I conduct novel surveys of firm owners and workers in two manufacturing sectors and document detailed hiring patterns. I document that labor sharing is a widespread practice with over 80% of surveyed firms recently participating. It shares a common structure as uncompensated, reciprocal, locally-concentrated, and manager-organized. Labor sharing serves two main purposes: it effectively screens workers and provides state-contingent labor, which allows firms to flexibly expand and meet demand shocks. To estimate firm and worker valuations of labor sharing, I deploy a series of stated choice experiments, and find that firms value labor sharing at a 35% premium over other hiring* *channels, but workers value it similarly to other types of referrals. I estimate a partial equilibrium model of the labor market where firms face uncertainty over consumer demand and worker quality. I show that the labor sharing economy increases total welfare by 10% compared to an economy with no sharing. I use the model to show that labor sharing shapes the impact and incidence of active labor market policies, such as training and screening. Other policies, such as wage subsidies, can backfire and reduce welfare by crowding out labor sharing.*

Working Papers

Reallocation under Rationing: Evidence from Electricity Outages in South Africa (with Rowan Clarke, Christopher Eaglin, and Jun Wong)

Abstract: *Rationing policies are often designed with equity considerations in mind, yet whether equalizing exposure delivers equal economic impacts remains underexplored. We study electricity outages in South Africa, where rationing equalizes exposure across locations. Combining high frequency outage data with geocoded transactions from over 11,000 firms from 2021 to 2023, we show that equal exposure does not imply equal impact. Average sales remain unchanged, but outages induce reallocation: below-median firms lose roughly 11 percent of average revenue, while above-median firms gain 10 percent. We provide novel evidence that consumer substitution drives these effects and that advance notice amplifies disparities.*

The Long-Run Legacy of Temporary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from Childhood Immunization (with Anne Karing and Juliette Finetti)

Abstract: *We investigate the impact of incentives and their removal on parents' decisions to vaccinate subsequent children. We follow up with parents three years after exposure to a bracelet incentive for timely vaccination in Sierra Leone, leveraging the random assignment of clinics to implement the incentive. Since only parents with a newborn at the time of the experiment were eligible for the incentive, we exploit within-clinic variation in exposure. First, we find that parents who received an incentive for an earlier child are 5 to 11% less likely to vaccinate their subsequent child on time compared to parents in the control group. There are no effects on vaccination rates by 15 months of age, suggesting that parents delay vaccination rather than abstaining altogether. Second, parents living in communities where incentives were implemented but who were ineligible for them exhibit no changes in vaccination behavior, ruling out changes in community norms or clinic as explanations. Third, incentives that were valued as signals of vaccination completion do not result in adverse effects after their removal. Our causal forest analysis suggests that parents with higher vaccination costs are most affected by these negative effects. Taken together, our findings suggest that experience of incentives can reduce parents' intrinsic motivation. These findings have important implications: while policy makers commonly focus on moving individuals to adopt a desirable behavior, we show that incentives may significantly impact the motivation of those already performing the desired action.*

Work in Progress

Job Seekers' Beliefs and Labor Market Demand (with Erin M. Kelley, Gregory Lane, Harry Moroz, Mohit Negi, and Evelyn Vezza) *Registered Report Conditionally Accepted, Journal of Development Economics*

The Economics of Informal Electricity Connections (with Jun Wong)

Awards, Scholarships, and Grants

Becker Friedman Institute Development Economics Research Fund *2025*

Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago *2025*

Lloyd & Susanne Rudolph Field Research Award, CISSR, $5,000	*2025*
Implementation Grant, J-PAL King Climate Action Initiative	*2025*
Implementation Grant, Weiss Fund for Development Economics, $25,000	*2025*
Pilot Grant, J-PAL King Climate Action Initiative, $22,760	*2024*
PhD Research Grant, CEPR-STEG, $19,000	*2024*
Small Research Grant, International Growth Centre, $33,000	*2024*
Pilot Grant, Weiss Fund for Development Economics, $14,445	*2023*
Pilot Grant, Weiss Fund for Development Economics, $15,000	*2023*
Proposal Development Grant, J-PAL King Climate Action Initiative, $9,090	*2023*
Exploratory Travel Grant, UChicago Development Economics Research Fund, $5,000	*2023*
Trustees' Award, awarded to the top graduating students at MSU	*2019*
Edward A. & Eleanor B. Carlin Award, for distinguished achievement in economics at MSU	*2018*

Teaching Experience

The University of Chicago

Elements of Economic Analysis I Honors (Undergraduate)	TA for Prof. Lima	*Fall 2025*
Behavioral Development Economics (Undergraduate)	TA for Prof. Karing	*Winter 2024*
Behavioral Development Economics (Ph.D.)	TA for Prof. Karing	*Winter 2024*
Behavioral Development Economics (Undergraduate)	TA for Prof. Karing	*Winter 2023*
Practicalities of Running Randomized Control Trials (Ph.D.)	TA for Prof. Glennerster	*Fall 2023*

Michigan State University

Introduction to Macroeconomics (Undergraduate)	TA for Prof. Goddeeris	*Fall 2018*
Introduction to Macroeconomics (Undergraduate)	TA for Prof. Amsler	*Fall 2017*

Research Experience and Other Employment

Research Consultant for the World Bank, Buenos Aires, Argentina	*2025*
Research Assistant for Prof. Rachel Glennerster, University of Chicago	*2023*
Research Assistant at the Development Innovation Lab, University of Chicago	*2022 – 2023*
Senior Research Analyst, Federal Reserve Bank of New York	*2019 – 2021*
Visiting Researcher, Economic Policy Research Institute, Cape Town	*2019*

Professional Experience

Organizer of Student Development Working Group, University of Chicago	*2022 – 2024*
Scientific Committee, Midwest International Development Economics Conference	*2024*

Conferences	*University of Cape Town, ERSA-SALDRU December Workshop*
Presentations	*International Growth Centre*
Refereeing Activity	*Journal of Health Economics*

Other Writing

Economics of Informal Electricity Connections (with Jun Wong), *CEPR-STEG: Growth Research Program*, Policy Brief

Additional Information

Citizenship	USA
Programming Skills	R, Stata, LaTeX, Matlab, SAS
Languages	English (Native), Spanish (B2)

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